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CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE TILLMAN-
McLAURIN CONTROVERSY.
On the 22nd of February last, and while the Senate of the
United States was engaged in considering the bill known as H. R.
5833, being a bill temporarily to provide revenue for the Philippine
Islands, and for other purposes, the two senators from the State
of South Carolina, Messrs. Benjamin R. Tillman and John L.
McLaurin, became involved in a personal controversy leading up
to a physical encounter between the two men, in which Senator
Tillman was the aggressor; in consequence whereof the Senate
on motion proceeded in closed, or executive session, to consider
what was alleged to be a grave breach of the privileges of the
Senate, and the following order was adopted by a vote of sixty-one
yeas; no votes being recorded in the negative:
"FEBRUARY 22, 1902.
Ordered, That the two senators from the State of South Caro-
lina be declared in contempt of the Senate on account of the
altercation and personal encounter between them this day in open
session, and that the matter be referred to the Committee on Privi-
leges and Elections, with instructions to report what action shall be
taken by the Senate in regard thereto."
Before the committee made its report, which it did on the 28th
of February, the bill mentioned above came to a vote in the Senate.
Before this the president pro tent. of the Senate, Senator Frye.
directed the clerk to omit from the roll call the names of the offend-
ing senators, which was done, and before the vote on the bill was
taken, Senator Turner, on behalf of Senator Tillman, presented a
protest of the latter against the deprivation of his State from voting
upon the pending measure, upon the broad ground that the Senate
could not in the manner that had been attempted thus constitutionally
deprive the State of South Carolina from the exercise, through its
senators, of the State's right of suffrage. Nevertheless. and with-
out calling or permitting the two senators to vote on the bill. the
vote was taken, and the bill passed by a substantial majority, which
majority would not have been materially affected had both the
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senators been permitted to vote, and both had voted against the
measure.
On the 28th of February, the Senate Committee on Privileges
and Elections made its report to the Senate, which, after quoting
from the official record the report of the controversy and encounter,
recommended the adoption of the following resolution:
"Resolved, That it is the judgment of the Senate that the
senators from South Carolina, Benjamin R. Tillman and John L.
McLaurin, for disorderly behavior and flagrant violation of the
rules of the Senate during the open session of the Senate on thie
2:2nd day of February, instant, deserve the censure of the Senate,
and they are hereby so censured for their breach of the privileges
and dignity of this body, and from and after the adoption of this
resolution, the order adjudging them in contempt of the Senate be
no longer in force and effect."
Senators Bailey, Pettus, Blackburn, Du Bois and Foster dissented
from so much of the report of the committee as asserted the power
of the Senate to suspend a senator and thus deprive a State of its
vote, and so much as described the offences of the senators as of
different gravity, but they approved the resolution reported. Two
other senators disagreed as to the punishment proposed by the
majority, and one disagreed as to the punishment inflicted upon
Senator McLaurin. It is not necessary, however, to consider
further that phase of the report.
From the foregoing review of this very painful incident in the
annals of the Senate, it will be perceived that grave constitutional
questions were involved, and it is proposed in a brief way to consider
these questions, and for the purpose of this discussion they may be
thus divided:
i. What is the extent of the power of the Senate under the
Constitution to punish its members for breaches of its privileges?
2. In the exercise of the foregoing power may the Senate
deprive a State of its constitutional right of suffrage therein?
It is around the second of the questions, as stated above, that
debate has been warmest and much feeling aroused, and it will be
considered in this paper. But in considering it the other will
necessarily be more or less touched upon.
The last clause of Article V. of the Constitution provides "that
no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage
in the Senate." It is, perhaps, safe to say that no provision of the
Constitution gave as much trouble to the constitutional convention
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as did this one. On more than one occasion it seriously threatened-
to terminate the sessions of the convention, and it was only by
the exercise of the greatest tact and patience by some of the gifted
leaders of that memorable body that the work of the convention
went on to completion. The struggle over this clause, or rather
the principle of it, was between the small States on the one hand
and the larger ones on the other: between the national and federal
ideas of the government to be; and it is no exaggeration to declare
that but for the acceptance of the principle of the equal suffrage of
the States, by the convention, there would have been no constitution
to submit for ratification.
This being the history of the provision we are considering, its
meaning being clear and needing no elucidation, it seems an amazing
proposition that the Senate by a majority, or two-thirds vote. or
its presiding officer on his own motion, can legally, constitutionally
nullify it, and most effectually deny to a State its equal suffrage in
that body, as was done in the case of South Carolina, because its
two senators, in an unseemly altercation, grossly offended the
rules and proprietors of the upper house.
The argument in favor of the power of suspension may thus
be stated: The second paragraph of section 5, of Article I. of the
Constitution, provides that, "Each house may determine the rules of
its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and
with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." It is said
that this clause furnishes two grounds, upon either or both of which
the suspension argument may be rested, the first being the power
given to punish members, apparently without any limitation; the
second, the power to expel a member.
Clearly in the recent incident the effect of suspending Senators
Tillman and McLaurin was, for the time being at least, to deprive
South Carolina of its right of equal suffrage in the Senate. What
is that right? It is the right or privilege of voting respecting
political questions: of participation in political government by voting
for laws or measures. And this for several days was denied to
South Carolina by the order of suspension. During this period of
suspension the Senate voted upon, and passed, among other meas-
ures. the Philippine Government bill.
If the extreme contentions of the advocates of the suspension
order be sound, then the two constitutional pr1-'isi(tns under con-
sideration are hopelessly irreconcilable. and a State can be deprived
of its equal suffrage in the Senate, when that body (determines to
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punish a State's representatives therein by denying to them the
right to vote upon pending laws and measures.
The precise question involved has never been the subject ofjudicial determination. Of course, cases there are in plenty in thebooks that deal with the power of legislative bodies to punish
their members for breaches of their privileges, and in one case in
the Supreme Court, that of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, io3 U. S., i68,
there is dictum to the effect that the respective Houses of Congress
can imprison their members as a punishment. But are the two
provisions in question really in conflict, or if apparently so, may
they not be construed in accordance with accepted canons of con-
struction, giving to each its full force and effect, and all apparent
conflict avoided? It is insisted that they may be.
To do this, however, it will be necessary to deny to the Senate
power to inflict one form of punishment, that of suspension, which
would include imprisonment.
It is to be noted that the second paragraph of section 5, Article
I. of the Constitution does not in terms prescribe such a form ofpunishment, but simply authorizes each House to "punish its mem-bers for disorderly behavior." This plainly contemplates punish-
ment of the man, not the State he represents. This can effectively
be accomplished by the forfeiture of some or all of those personal
advantages that attach to his office; such as a loss of salary or ofimportant committee assignments. He might be publicly repri-
manded or denied leave of absence, or all of these unpleasant and
mortifying evidences of his colleagues' disapprobation may be visited
upon him. And if his offense was of such a character as wouldjustify his expulsion, this punishment may be inflicted. But ininflicting it a due regard for a State's right of equal suffrage in
the Senate, must be observed. To do this needs but some care in
the procedure to be followed.
When the Senate has concluded to expel one of its members,
notification of the fact should be made to the proper authority of
the State such member represents, and an opportunity given to
select and appoint his successor. If the State fdils or refuses to do
this within a reasonable time, that should be designated by theSenate, it may well be held to have waived its right of equal suffrage,
and the judgment of expulsion should be made effective, and theState would remain without its representative until it chose to select
one in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.
To admit the power of suspension is to make possible the
nullification of the right of the States to equal suffrage in the upper
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branches of the national legislature. It is unpleasant to consider
what an unscrupulous majority in the Senate might do under the
itress of a supposed political necessity, if such a power resided
in it. By denying it the power to suspend, the power to punish
its members for disorderly behavior is not seriously, if at all,
impaired. By admitting the power, a fundamental principle of the
government established by the Constitution, the principle of the
equality of the States, is threatened, and, as we have seen in this
Tillman-McLaurin affair, may be, in the case of individual States,
at least, absolutely set at naught.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Senate's power to punish
its members cannot be constitutionally so exercised as to deprive a
State of its right of equal suffrage, and that the suspension of
Senators Tillman and McLaurin, considering that suspension as
being made on the order of the Senate, was unconstitutional because
it did deprive the State of South Carolina of its equal suffrage
therein. F. L. Siddons.
